Meredith Williams: Blind Obedience: The Structure and Content of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy

New from Routledge: Meredith Williams’ Blind Obedience: The Structure and Content of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy. Prof. Williams (Philosophy, Johns Hopkins) is the author of Wittgenstein, Mind, and Meaning: Towards a Social Conception of Mind (Routledge, 1999).

Here is the publisher’s description of Williams’ new book:

There is considerable debate amongst philosophers as to the basic philosophical problem Wittgenstein is attempting to solve in Philosophical Investigations. In this bold and original work, Meredith Williams argues that it is the problem of “normative similarity”.

In Blind Obedience Williams demonstrates how Wittgenstein criticizes traditional, representationalist theories of language by employing the ‘master/novice’ distinction of the learner, arguing that this distinction is often overlooked but fundamental to understanding philosophical problems about mind and language.

The book not only provides revealing discussions of Wittgenstein’s corpus but also intricate analyses of the work of Brandom, Dummett, Frege, Sellars, Davidson, Cavell and others. These are usefully compared in a bid to better situate Wittgenstein’s non-intellectualist, non-theoretical approach and to highlight its unique features.

And here is the table of contents:

1. Structure and Content of the Philosophical Investigations 2. Playing the Game 3. The Domestication of Reference 4. Logical Form and the Paradox of Thought 5. Meaning and the Paradox of Interpretation 6. Normativity and the Threat of Regularism 7. Necessity and the Threat of Psychologism 8.The Paradoxes of Consciousness 9. Concluding Remarks

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